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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Jered Josiah Wilson appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily 
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  On appeal, Mr. Wilson contends that 
the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with 
regard to four of Mr. Wilson’s claims, the evidence was sufficient to raise genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether counsel was ineffective for agreeing to join two unrelated 
cases for trial and for failing to call witnesses and put on evidence which would have 
cast doubt on the State’s case and the truthfulness of its witnesses.  The Petition was 
dismissed despite the fact that the district court found trial counsel’s strategy to join two 
unrelated cases for trial was based on ignorance, and despite the affidavits of four 
potential witnesses which set forth relevant and admissible information helpful to the 
defense, and to which they would have testified had they been called at trial.   
Two underlying criminal cases, in which Mr. Wilson had been charged with two 
counts related to his sex offender registration and two counts of lewd conduct, had been 
consolidated for trial.  One incident of lewd conduct was alleged to have occurred in a 
car while Mr. Wilson was driving from Twin Falls to Emmett, Idaho, and one incident of 
lewd conduct purportedly occurred in Mr. Wilson’s house in Emmett.  Mr. Wilson 
submitted affidavits showing one available witness would have testified that Mr. Wilson 
was not living at the house in Emmett during the relevant time period and one witness 
would have testified that he was usually in the car with Mr. Wilson when he drove to 
Twin Falls.  Further, Mr. Wilson submitted affidavits and evidence to demonstrate 
counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to call any witnesses or introduce any evidence 
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which was available and which would have cast further doubt on the victim’s credibility 
and/or shown the events as the State’s witnesses described them were improbable.  
Therefore, the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on these four 
claims.   
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous assertions and 
conclusions made in its Respondent’s Brief. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Wilson’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Wilson’s Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Wilson’s Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
 
In analyzing whether summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim is 
appropriate, “[a] court is required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as 
true . . . .”  Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 
Idaho 319, 321 (1995).  Thus, if a petitioner alleges facts in his verified pleading and 
affidavit which, viewed as though they were true, would show deficient performance and 
prejudice, then the court may not summarily dismiss a claim.   
The standard for establishing a genuine issue of material fact is lower than the 
standard applied to a claim at an ensuing evidentiary hearing.  See Storm v. State, 112 
Idaho 718, 720 (1987) (recognizing a difference between the standards used in an 
evidentiary hearing versus a summary dismissal proceeding).  At the evidentiary 
hearing, the petitioner is “required to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 
2005) (explaining this standard in the context of the differing standards between the 
evidentiary hearing and the summary dismissal proceedings); cf. Stuart v. State, 118 
Idaho 865, 869 (1990) (recognizing this as the standard for post-conviction cases 
generally).  On the other hand, the proper standard for summary disposition 
proceedings, as the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, is based on a consideration of 
the alleged facts’ “relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties,” meaning a 
fact has some logical connection to the consequential facts under that legal theory.  
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (internal quotation omitted).  “If such a 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.”   Id. 
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Mr. Wilson established the existence of issues of material fact as to his 
assertions that his trial counsel was ineffective for agreeing to join his two cases based 
on the erroneous belief that this strategy would prohibit the State from adding a 
sentencing enhancement.1  Mr. Wilson also asserted that trial counsel failed to call 
several witnesses whose testimony would have further eroded the credibility of the 
victim and failed to introduce evidence that he could not drive for lengthy periods of 
time, which would have made the possibility that the events occurred as the victim 
described even less likely.   
At the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Wilson is only required to raise an issue a 
genuine issue of material fact, which is when “‘the appellant has alleged facts in his 
petition that if true, would entitle him to relief.’”  Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
792 (2004) (quoting Stuart, 118 Idaho at 934).   
Even if he was required to do more than just allege prejudice based on the issue 
raised, Mr. Wilson did so in this case by making a prima facie showing of prejudice as 
evidenced by trial counsel’s failure to call the defense witnesses or submit evidence of 
Mr. Wilson’s physical impairments or driving restrictions. 
In support of his claims, Mr. Wilson submitted several sworn affidavits and other 
evidence.  The affidavits submitted in support of Mr. Wilson’s Petition called into 
question the veracity of the testimony presented at trial.  For example, the State’s 
witness, J.K.W., initially testified that it was just she and Mr. Wilson in the car; however, 
the affidavit of Jered L. Wilson indicated he would have testified that he or another 
                                            
1 Mr. Wilson fully addressed this argument in his initial Appellant’s Brief and will not 
reiterate his arguments herein. 
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family member was usually in the car as Mr. Wilson had medical issues or license 
suspensions during this time; thus, his testimony would have impeached the credibility 
of J.K.W.  (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.12-17; R., pp.55-56.)  As another example, J.K.W. 
testified that there were incidents of lewd conduct inside the house, yet the affidavit of 
Barbara Wilson made clear that Mr. Wilson was not living at the house during the 
relevant time period.  (Trial Tr., p.331, L.22 – p.333, L.19; R., p.59.)  This was a 
legitimate defense as to one of the lewd conduct charges.   
The State mischaracterizes the expected testimony of Jered L. Wilson by 
claiming that the testimony would have shown he was in the car during “at least one” of 
the trips from Twin Falls to Emmett and no abuse had taken place.  (Respondent’s 
Brief, p.10.)  However, Mr. Jered L. Wilson’s affidavit states that he was in the car with 
Mr. Wilson and J.K.W. for trips for family visitations, and he had knowledge of other 
family members in the car during these trips.  (R., pp.55-56.)  Mr. Jered L. Wilson also 
had knowledge regarding Mr. Wilson’s driving restrictions and leg injury.  (R., pp.55-56.)  
Additional information such as the foundation for his knowledge could have, and should 
have, been explored at an evidentiary hearing.   
The State fails to recognize that the anticipated testimony of Barbara Wilson was 
that the acts could not have happened as J.K.W. alleged, where Mr. Wilson’s sister was 
the occupant of the house during the times in which the allegations against J.K.W. were 
alleged to have occurred and Mr. Wilson did not live there or go there with J.K.W.  
(R., p.59.)  Additional information such as the foundation for her knowledge could have, 
and should have, been explored at an evidentiary hearing.   
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The State claims that the decision not to call any of the defense witnesses was 
tactical and there was no evidence of prejudice.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.12-14.)  
However, this is not a situation where defense counsel chose not to call these four 
witnesses because the testimony would be duplicative of testimony already adduced by 
the other defense witnesses.  Here, defense counsel failed to call a single witness in its 
case in chief and failed to present an opening statement as to what any information 
gleaned by cross-examination meant to Mr. Wilson’s case.  While defense counsel may 
have superficially inquired into some of the witnesses’ topics during his cross-
examination,2 he did not call witnesses who would have thoroughly addressed these 
topics—thus, requiring the jury to speculate during cross-examination, which was not a 
reasonable trial strategy when the full information was available through multiple 
witnesses.  At this juncture, failure to present any defense when witnesses were 
available, had relevant information, and were ready, willing, and able to testify 
demonstrates incompetence, not trial strategy. 
While the Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held that counsel’s decision not 
to call witnesses as part of the defense’s case falls within the realm of trial tactics, see 
Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 411 (Ct. App. 1989), there is no evidence that 
Mr. Wilson’s counsel had any such intent.  Further, in a credibility case such as this, a 
failure to call any defense witnesses when such witnesses were available and had 
admissible, relevant testimony that went to the heart of the accusations against 
Mr. Wilson, was deficient performance.  Mr. Wilson has demonstrated that, by calling 
these witnesses at trial, their testimony would have been useful in the defense’s case.  
                                            
2 See Trial Tr., p.285, L.19 – p.287, L.7; p.342, L.12 – p.344, L.5. 
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C.f. Davis, 116 Idaho at 407-08 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding, after an evidentiary hearing, 
that defense counsel’s failure to interview prosecution witnesses did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice defendant where the record on appeal of 
the post-conviction order did not indicate that attorney would have discovered new or 
unique information which would have been useful in preparing the defense of 
Mr. Davis).   
The State claims that Mr. Wilson has failed to show defense counsel’s “decision 
to not present the evidence was based on an objective shortcoming” (Respondent’s 
Brief, p.14.)  Not only did defense counsel fail to interview and call witnesses with 
testimony helpful to client’s case, but he presented no defense case at all.  (Trial 
Tr., p.392, Ls.1-16.)  The State claims that some part of the evidence in the affidavits 
submitted by Mr. Wilson was adduced on cross-examination; however, any argument to 
that effect is absent from defense counsel’s closing remarks.  There were no references 
to Mr. Wilson’s inability to drive, the fact that he wasn’t living in the house, or the various 
relatives who drove Mr. Wilson in the car with J.K.W.  (Trial Tr., p.425, L.11 – p.438, 
L.22.) 
The State gives short shrift to the information Mr. Wilson submitted in support of 
his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of his 
employment, driving, and medical records.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.10-11.)  However, 
Mr. Wilson submitted evidence that his regular driver’s license, as well as his 
commercial driver’s license, were suspended for considerable periods of time.  
(R., pp.65-68.)  His commercial driver’s license was suspended on September 15, 2006 
and was not reinstated until March 20, 2007.  (R., p.67.)  His standard driver’s license 
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was suspended on March 20, 2006 for a period of 180 days.  (R., p.65.)  His standard 
driver’s license was reinstated effective September 16, 2006.  (R., p.68.)  Such 
information further undermines the State’s case.  While it was not clear if these dates in 
which Mr. Wilson’s driver’s license was restricted provided a complete alibi defense, in a 
case such as Mr. Wilson’s where the word of one person, the victim, J.K.W., was the 
sole testimony and evidence the State had to prove its lewd conduct charges, any 
additional flaws in her version of events could erode her credibility to the jury.  Such a 
determination would be key to a defense for these charges, particularly where there was 
no physical evidence corroborating the victim’s statements.  The district court should 
have thus held an evidentiary hearing where such evidence undercutting the testimony 
of the State’s witnesses could be examined.   
The State claims that the medical records Mr. Wilson submitted in support of his 
Petition establish only that he twice went to the emergency room complaining of ankle 
pain.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.11.)  However, the medical records show that Mr. Wilson 
was unable to work for a period of time due to his original ankle injury, which occurred in 
November of 2005.  (R., pp.69-73.)  The record of the visit on April 16, 2006 indicates 
that Mr. Wilson’s injury, a rip in his Achilles tendon, necessitated surgical repair by an 
orthopedic surgeon.  (R., p.69.)  On April 16, 2006, prior to surgery, he was instructed to 
use crutches for walking and not to bear weight on the injury area.  (R., p.69.)  He had 
already undergone surgical repair previously, on October 15, 2005, for a fracture to the 
area.  (R., p.69.)  The medical record of his visit to the emergency department on 
January 22, 2007, indicated that Mr. Wilson had a sprained right ankle and was again 
instructed to be on crutches and not to bear weight on the injury.  (R., pp.70-71.) 
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At the hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court 
provided its rationale regarding whether the testimony and evidence of Mr. Wilson’s 
inability to drive established an issue of material fact.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12, 
L.12.)  The district court summarized the medical records as, “on April 16th, 2006, he 
was in a knee splint, used crutches, no weight bearing.  And then January 22, 2007, 
sprained ankle, crutches till comfortable to engage in normal activities.  Did I miss 
something?”  (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.2.)  The district court noted that “we don’t 
have anything that indicates for all of 2006 and all of 2007 he was medically prohibited 
from driving.  And similarly, we don’t have any driving record that indicates he was 
prohibited from driving all of 2006 and all of 2007.”  (3/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.)  
However, in order to establish an issue of material fact, Mr. Wilson did not have 
to establish that he was physically unable to drive for the entire two-year time period.   
At the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Wilson needed to show there existed a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether his counsel’s deficient conduct “so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  He 
sufficiently established that he was entitled to a hearing where he substantiated his 
allegations with multiple affidavits which set forth the witnesses’ availability and a 
summary of their expected testimony.  Mr. Wilson had to establish that a genuine issue 
of material fact existed as to whether his counsel was deficient and if so, whether there 
was a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient conduct, the result of the trial 
would have been different, and he did so.  Defense counsel failed to call the witnesses 
or present evidence of Mr. Wilson’s inability to drive for much of the relevant time 
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period.  Such would have likely been sufficient to place the necessary level of doubt in 
the jurors’ minds of Mr. Wilson’s guilt.   
Thus, Mr. Wilson raised multiple issues of material fact, through the verified 
petition and the multiple affidavits and records submitted in support of his Petition.  This 
case exemplifies the reasons why an evidentiary hearing is necessary.  It is only 
through an evidentiary hearing, where the witnesses could be called and questioned as 
to their anticipated testimony, that the district court could determine whether relief was 
warranted. 
The district court’s dismissal of all of Mr. Wilson’s claims was error where 
Mr. Wilson actually presented prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel 
regarding these issues and demonstrated a reasonable probability that, absent 
counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. 
    
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal of 
his post-conviction petition with respect to the issues of whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate/agreeing to join the two cases and for failing to call 
witnesses and introduce evidence at trial, and remand the case to the district court for 
an evidentiary hearing on these issues.   
 DATED this 24th day of August, 2016. 
 
      _________/s/________________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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